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This paper reports the results of an ad hoc survey on price-setting behaviour conducted in 
February 2004 among 2,000 Belgian firms. The reported results clearly deviate from a situation of 
perfect competition and show that firms have some market power. Pricing-to-market is applied by a 
majority of industrial firms. Prices are rather sticky. The average duration between two consecutive 
price reviews is 10 months, whereas it amounts to 13  months between two consecutive price 
changes. Most firms adopt time-dependent price-reviewing under normal circumstances. However, 
when specific events occur, the majority will adopt a state-dependent behaviour. Evidence is found 
in favour of both nominal (mainly implicit and explicit contracts) and real rigidities (including flat 
marginal costs and counter-cyclical movements in desired mark-ups). The survey results point to a 
non-negligible degree of non-optimal price-setting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper reports the results of an ad hoc survey on price-setting behaviour in about 2,000 Belgian 
firms from the sectors industry, construction, trade and services to enterprises. Overall, these 
sectors represent 60 p.c. of the Belgian GDP. The survey was conducted by the National Bank of 
Belgium in February 2004 and as such it constitutes the Belgian part of a euro area-wide initiative 
within the scope of the "Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network". Its content was mainly inspired 
by similar surveys carried out by Blinder et al. (1998) in the United States, Apel et al. (2001) in 
Sweden, Hall et al. (2000) in the United Kingdom and Fabiani et al. (2004) in Italy.  
 
The main purpose of the survey is to help describe the price rigidity prevailing in the economy, not 
only in quantitative terms but also in qualitative terms. This in turn provides valuable information to 
understand (i) the dynamic reaction of output and inflation to shocks and (ii) the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. The structure of the survey (and of this paper) has its roots in the 
crucial role played by price rigidities in the New-Keynesian literature, as it is for instance reviewed 
by Taylor (1999) in his well-known survey on staggered price and wage setting in macroeconomics. 
At least four aspects highlighted by Taylor are part of the survey. Moreover, when addressing these 
aspects in the survey, an attempt was made to incorporate more recent developments in the 
literature as well.  
 
First of all, Taylor (1999) emphasises the role of market power as a necessary condition for price 
stickiness to be a temporary equilibrium. Deviations from perfect competition - often in the form of 
monopolistic competition - are therefore a necessary ingredient of New-Keynesian macro-models. 
As a consequence, the survey contains a series of questions on the degree of competition on the 
firms’ main market and the extent to which it has market power. In this respect, the survey also 
addresses the question whether there exists pricing-to-market and why. 
 
Second, the survey allows us to verify Taylor’s quantitative description of the degree of price rigidity, 
simply by confronting (Belgian) firms directly with questions regarding the frequency of their price 
reviews and/or price changes. In this respect Taylor stresses that, notwithstanding a great deal of 
heterogeneity in price and wage setting, prices and wages are typically changed once every year. 
 
Third, the survey also examines whether firms follow mostly time-dependent or state-dependent 
pricing rules. Taylor (1999) stresses in this respect that the time-dependent characteristic - i.e. the 
exogeneity of the timing of price adjustment - of most price-setting models has been one of the 
most criticised assumptions of these models. State-dependent pricing is probably more realistic, but 
proves to be more difficult to model. The survey also tests whether there are other asymmetries in 
the response of prices, depending on either the nature and/or the direction of the shock. 
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Finally, the survey contains a qualitative question on the information set used in the price-setting 
process and tests a rather long list of theories on nominal and real rigidities, as these issues seem 
of particular interest when addressing the two persistence puzzles mentioned in Taylor (1999), 
namely inflation persistence and real output persistence. Based on his survey of the literature, 
Taylor suggests two main factors which can help understanding these persistence puzzles. These 
factors are (i) combining staggered price and wage setting with imperfect information and (ii) 
complementing nominal rigidity with a sufficient degree of real rigidities. To our knowledge, this 
survey is the first in addressing the issue of the information set used in the price-setting process, 
whereas the list of the tested theories on nominal and real rigidities is very similar to what was done 
by Apel et al. (2001) for Sweden. 
 
The survey has the major advantage of being capable to provide qualitative information on price-
setting behaviour and precisely these aspects have received a lot of attention, both in the 
questionnaire underlying the survey and in this paper. This is particularly so for the description of 
the market structure firms operate in, for the explicit distinction made between price reviews and 
price changes, for the qualitative characteristics of the information set used in the price-setting 
process and for the fact that a wide variety of both nominal and real rigidities is tested. 
 
A survey is indeed probably the only data source allowing a distinction to be made between price 
reviews and price changes, as observed price data will only reveal the final outcome of the price-
setting process, i.e. the changes. Moreover, survey results are probably the only source of 
information on the basis of which it is possible to get an answer to the question whether infrequent 
adjustment of prices is due to the existence of price-adjustment costs (nominal rigidities) and/or to 
the fact that the frictionless real (or relative) price does not change or changes only marginally when 
aggregate output fluctuates (real rigidity). Finally, observing a price change does not necessarily 
imply that the newly set price has been set in a completely optimal way and, in practice, it is hard to 
detect whether or not this is the case in quantitative price data sets. The question on the information 
set used in the price-reviewing process can, however, shed light on this issue. 
 
As such, this survey is a complement to the recent quantitative analysis of price rigidities based on 
Belgian sectoral CPI data (see Aucremanne et al. (2002)) and on Belgian micro CPI data (see 
Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004a) and (2004b)).  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II the sample and the questionnaire are 
presented. Section III describes the environment firms operate in and addresses the issues of 
competition and market power in particular. Section IV addresses the question of the moment when 
prices are adjusted, whether the pricing rules are time-dependent or state-dependent and which 
information set is used in the reviewing process. Section V examines various theories on both 
nominal and real price rigidities and section VI reports on asymmetries in the response of prices to  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005  3 
shocks. Section VII summarises some characteristics of flexible versus sticky firms. Section VIII, 
finally, offers some concluding remarks.  
 
 
II. SURVEY  DESIGN 
 
1. DATA COLLECTION 
 
The questionnaire was designed and the survey conducted by the National Bank of Belgium. A first 
draft of the questionnaire was sent to 20 firms in the industrial sector in the course of December 
2003. 14 out of 20 firms participated in this pilot study. They were later on contacted by phone in 
order to inquire for their general impression of the questionnaire, which was mainly positive. At the 
same time, we seized the opportunity to ask them why they did not answer certain questions and 
we tried to find out more about some improbable answers. The questionnaire was subsequently 
adapted, taking into account comments made by the participants. Moreover, some questions which 
were inappropriately answered and/or for which it was apparent that they were misunderstood by 
the pilot firms, were reformulated. 
 
In February 2004 the final questionnaire was sent by traditional mail
1 to the whole sample, 
excluding the firms who already participated in the pilot study and answers of which were treated as 
definite. It was accompanied by a covering letter explaining the importance of the survey and 
motivating firms to participate. The firms were asked to answer within 3 weeks. As the response 
rate was satisfactory at the final date, no reminder was sent. 
 
2. THE SAMPLE 
 
The sample used for the ad hoc survey is the existing sample applied for the monthly business 
survey of the National Bank of Belgium. It consists of 5,600 firms in the sectors industry, 
construction, trade
2 and services to enterprises
3. The sectors not covered by the survey are 
agriculture, energy, government and financial services, post and telecommunications and services 
directly offered to consumers (hotels, restaurants and cafés, health,...) (see appendix A for a 
detailed list). Overall, the sectors covered by the survey represent 60 p.c. of the Belgian GDP and 
84 p.c. of the overall turnover in the Belgian economy. 
 
1,979 firms participated in the survey, representing a response rate of 35%. The response rate was 
more or less equal for the various sectors, ranging from 38% in industry to 32% in construction.  
                                                           
1  Firms were supported by a help desk (by phone). 
2  Trade and repair of cars, wholesale and retail trade of a variety of goods. 
3  Transport and storage, real estate and renting, computer and related services, commission trade services and other 
business services. 4  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
 
Table 1 - The sample - number of firms 
 













        
Total 394,339  5,600  1,979  35  100 
Industry 44,439  2,000  753  38  30.9 
Construction 70,685  1,200  384  32  5.0 
Trade 132,292  1,400  478  34  36.7 
Services 146,923  1,000  364  36  27.4 
          
Industry, 0-49 employees 42,603  n.  433  n.  6.3 
Industry, 50-199 employees 1,363  n.  211  n.  5.2 
Industry, 200 and + employees  473  n.  109  n.  19.4 
Construction, 0-49 employees 70,211  n. 330  n.  3.5 
Construction, 50-199 employees  403  n.  45  n.  0.9 
Construction, 200 and + employees 71  n.  9 n.  0.6 
Trade, 0-49 employees  131,565 n.  429  n.  23.1 
Trade, 50-199 employees 585  n.  31  n.  6.5 
Trade, 200 and + employees  142  n.  18  n.  7.0 
Services, 0-49 employees 145,893  n.  291  n.  20.5 
Services, 50-199 employees  822  n.  54  n.  3.5 
Services, 200 and + employees  208  n.  19  n.  3.5 
          
 
Source: NBB. 
1  Firms liable to VAT and belonging to sectors covered by the survey, data over the year 2001. 
²  The sample used is the sample of the monthly business survey. 
 
 
The sample of the monthly business survey, which has been conducted for more than 50 years 
now, has been established in close collaboration with the sectoral employers' organisations. The 
latter do indeed have a good knowledge of the structure of the sector they represent and their 
regular contacts with members are valuable for the establishment and the regular update of the 
sample and the firms' permanent participation in the survey.  
 
The way the sample has been established created a bias towards the larger companies, as is 
shown in table 1. In order to represent the whole population of Belgian firms better, an "ex-post 
stratification" has been applied, dividing the population in 12 strata, according to sector and size in 
terms of number of employees. The results of the ad hoc survey were subsequently weighted by the 
structure of the total population in terms of turnover (see last column of table 1 for the weights 
used). In the analysis of the answers to the questionnaire these turnover-weighted results are 
focused on.  
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3. THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
An English translation of the questionnaire sent to firms in the industrial sector can be found in 
appendix B. 
 
The content of the questionnaire was mainly inspired by Apel et al. (2001), Blinder et al. (1998) and 
Fabiani et al. (2004), although some additional questions were included in order to take into account 
the fact that the Belgian economy is a very open one and that little is known about price-setting 
behaviour on foreign markets. Moreover, on designing the questionnaire, an attempt was made to 
incorporate the most recent developments in the relevant literature, in particular on the following two 
issues which are of particular interest when addressing the above-mentioned persistence puzzles 
stressed in Taylor (1999). 
 
First of all, as in Apel et al. (2001), a relatively long list of sources of price rigidity was tested, 
including both theories on nominal rigidities and theories on real rigidities (question B4). Jeanne 
(1998), Romer (2001), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) are examples of the New-Keynesian 
literature in which typically the interplay between both types of rigidity is emphasised, while Chari, 
Kehoe and Mc Grattan (2000) seriously challenge the ability of (empirically realistic) nominal 
rigidities, as such, to produce sufficient sluggishness at the aggregate level.  Second, a question 
was inserted on the information set the newly decided prices are based on (questions B2a and 
B2b), as deviations from a fully optimising behaviour can be an additional source of sluggishness in 
the response of inflation to shocks, for instance as a result of rule of thumb price setters as in Galí 
et al. (2001), as a result of indexation schemes as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) or 
Smets and Wouters (2003), or as a result of stickiness in either the information gathering and/or the 
optimisation processes as in Mankiw and Reiss (2002). To our knowledge, this survey is the first in 
addressing the latter issue. 
 
The questionnaire consists of three parts. In part A questions are asked with respect to the main 
market and the main product the questionnaire mainly focuses on, as well as questions regarding 
the degree of competition on the firms' main market, the extent to which it has market power or, 
alternatively, sets its price according to the price of its competitor(s). It also contains a question as 
to whether or not the firm decides autonomously on its price, firms which cannot set the price 
themselves being allowed to skip a large amount of questions. Most firms assert that they do set 
their price themselves (82 p.c.) and so do not tick the answers "the price is set by government", "the 
price is set by parent company/group" or "the price is set by others". 
 
Part B deals with price adjustments and asks questions about the frequency of price reviews and 
price changes. Moreover, it addresses issues such as the information set used when prices are 
reviewed, the question whether firms follow mostly time-dependent or state-dependent pricing rules 
and whether there are asymmetries in the response of prices, depending on either the nature and/or 6  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
the direction of the shock. Besides, a rather long list of theories regarding price rigidities, including 
both nominal and real rigidities, is tested.  
 
Part C, finally, should only be filled out by industrial firms operating on more than one market and 
tests whether or not price-setting behaviour differs across markets, i.e. if pricing-to-market (PTM) is 
applied. 
 
For the whole questionnaire, it was explicitly decided not to mention any reference period. We 
thought it would be better to ask questions about a general situation in order to eliminate the effect 
of specific events during one particular year on the results. Moreover, for some questions, such as 
those on the frequency of price reviews and price changes, our formulation avoids censoring 
problems and allows estimates for frequencies below once a year.  
 
The questionnaire in appendix B is aimed at the industrial sector. The questionnaires for 
construction, trade and services to enterprises are basically identical, though there are two major 
differences. As companies in the non-industrial sectors almost exclusively operate on the Belgian 
market, we provide no specification regarding the market they should refer their answers to. 
Industrial firms, on the other hand, should refer to the main market. Moreover, part C has been 
deleted for the non-industrial sectors.  
 
A second difference concerns the adaptation of the questionnaire to the specific context these firms 
operate in; instead of "main product", the terms "main activity" for construction and services and 
"main article" for trade are used. In addition, we pointed out in the preliminary remarks that in 
construction and services "the price" can sometimes be interpreted as "the hourly tariff charged". 
Although the answers to some questions are probably not relevant for certain sectors (e.g. question 
B4: the theory with regard to the use of attractive thresholds is probably not relevant for 
construction), we preferred to keep the same number of questions for each sector. This facilitates 
the comparison between sectors in our analysis.  
 
The survey contains three types of questions. In a first set of questions, respondents are asked to 
indicate the importance of a given statement, the alternatives being "1 = unimportant", "2 = of minor 
importance", "3 = important", "4 = very important" and "? = I don't know". The mean scores that we 
report for this type of question are the averages of the first four alternatives, question marks or 
blanks being ignored for the calculation of the mean. Based on the mean scores, statements have 
been ranked in descending order. Moreover, for each pair of statements, a Wilcoxon signed rank  
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test
4 has been carried out, in order to know whether or not the importance attached by respondents 
to the first statement is significantly different from the importance attached to the second statement. 
In the second type of questions firms are asked to tick one answer out of a list of possibilities. In a 
third type of questions a precise quantitative answer is required. Response rates have been 
calculated for each question and they are mentioned in the tables. They have always been 
satisfactory, except for question A6 on the magnitude of the price elasticity of demand, the 
response rate having been below 50 p.c. 
 
All results reported in this paper are weighted according to the turnover-based weighting scheme 
presented in table1. However, a decomposition of the variance of all survey results (see 
appendix  C) reveals that the largest part of the variance (often over 90  p.c.) stems from the 
variance within strata and that a small part stems from the variance between sectors, the variance 
between firm size always being negligible. This is consistent with the fact that results did not change 
much after weighting.  
 
As in some cases the variance between sectors exceeds 10 p.c. of the total variance, further tests 
on the significance of sectoral differences (see appendix D) have been conducted, either by means 
of a Chi-square test of equality of sectoral distributions or by using a Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient in the cases allowing a ranking. In this paper most results are presented both for the total 
group of responding firms and for a sectoral breakdown. The latter is however only discussed 
explicitly when the above-mentioned tests showed that sectoral differences are worth stating. A 
breakdown by firm size is not presented, as the variance decomposition showed that the variance 
between firm size is always negligible. 
 
 
III.  ENVIRONMENT FIRMS OPERATE IN 
 
1. MARKET STRUCTURE  
 
As the questionnaire focuses on price-setting behaviour for the main product, it is important to know 
whether or not this product is representative of the firm. This seems to be the case, as, on average, 
69 p.c. of the turnover stems from the main product.  
 
 
                                                           
4   The results for this set of questions are of an ordinal nature and a rank test should be used. As the same sample of firms 
is responding to the different statements within one question, we hold that there is a connection between the 
corresponding data and a Wilcoxon signed rank test should be used. In order to obtain the same number of answers for 
each pair of statements, we deleted the (very limited) group of non-responding firms. 8  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 





  Industry Construction  Trade  Services  to 
enterprises 
Total 
0 - 25 p.c.  11  0  22  0  12 
26 - 50 p.c.  16  3  21  5  15 
51 - 75 p.c.  23  20  24  15  21 
76 - 100 p.c.  50  77  34  80  52 
Total 100  100  100  100  100 
p.m. response rate  100  100  100  100  100 
Average percentage  67.7 p.c.  86.1 p.c.  53.3 p.c.  87.4 p.c.  68.7 p.c. 





Sectoral differences are relatively important and are almost always significant between services to 
enterprises and construction, on the one hand, and trade and industry, on the other hand
5. Indeed, 
the average share of turnover stemming from the main product is high for the first group (almost 
90 p.c.), while it is much lower for industry (68 p.c.) and even more so for trade (53 p.c.). The latter 
sector, and certainly the retail branch, is characterised by a wide variety of products within one firm 
and it is much more difficult to define one main product. This is an important point, since, if firms do 
not have one specific product in mind, answers with respect to the frequency of price adjustments 
(see part B of the questionnaire) would no longer be reliable. So, by focusing on the main product, 
representativeness and a sufficient degree of specificity are weighed against each other. 
 
 




  Industry 
Belgian market  54.7 
Another euro area country  37.7 
A non-euro area country  7.6 
Total 100 





More than 50 p.c. of industrial firms indicate that Belgium is the main market for their main product. 
This result is not contradictory to the open character of the Belgian economy, more than 70 p.c. of 
turnover of the participating firms in the industrial sector being generated on foreign markets, as 
                                                           
5  See appendix C for a variance decomposition of question A2 and appendix D for the Chi-square test of equality of 
sectoral distributions.  
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question A3 asks for one specific main market for the main product. This is in most cases the 
Belgian market, exports being spread over a large number of countries. The motivation to focus on 
one single market (the main market) is similar to the one to focus on one single product, namely 
that a sufficient degree of specificity should be attained. 
 
 









           
Companies within own group  18.5  4.1  7.8  7.9  9.8 10.8 
Companies outside own group            
 with  long-term  relationship  45.2  16.4  19.3  2.6  46.0 32.7 
  with no long-term 
relationship 
19.4 9.3  6.0  1.8  17.0 12.4 
Consumers 14.2  48.7  64.6  86.8  23.3 40.2 
Government 2.7  21.6  2.3  1.0  3.9 3.8 
Total 100  100  100  100  100 100 





The nature of the relationship with customers also shows significant differences between sectors 
(see appendix D for the results of the Chi-quare tests on sectoral differences). Whereas around 
60 p.c. of the turnover in industry and services to enterprises is realised with customers they have 
some kind of long-term relationship with (either with companies within the own group or with 
companies outside the group which they have explicitly stated to have a long-term relationship 
with), the trade sector is mainly consumer-oriented (65 p.c.). In the latter case we assume that the 
existence of a long-term relationship is far less likely
6. The predominance of relationships with 
consumers in trade results from retail, 87  p.c. of the turnover there being generated with 
consumers. Orientation towards consumers is also observed in construction (49 p.c.), government 
being their second largest customer (22  p.c.). A somewhat surprising phenomenon is the not 
unimportant share of turnover of services to enterprises stemming from consumers (23 p.c.). This is 
recorded in the branches "renting of cars", "insurance brokers", "computer and related services"; 
"lawyers" and "notaries". 
 
                                                           
6  The question on the existence of a long-term relationship with consumers was not asked explicitly, in order to simplify the 
questionnaire. 10  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
2. COMPETITION AND MARKET POWER 
 
2.1  Rationale for the approach adopted 
 
The degree of competition is a crucial variable in price-setting behaviour. As a matter of fact, Taylor 
(1999) provides several references going back to Arrow (1959) which all stress that some degree of 
market power is needed to make the price decision of a firm meaningful. In the absence of market 
power (perfect competition), all firms sell at a unique market clearing price. In case of perfect 
competition, there would be no mark-up, the price being equal to marginal costs, and price rigidities 
would not exist. Therefore, following Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), New-Keynesian models with 
sticky prices nowadays typically assume monopolistic competition. In such an environment prices 
are set as a mark-up over marginal costs and this leaves the individual firm some room for not 
adjusting prices when costs change. 
 
Looking at it from this angle, the existence of some form of market power is a prerequisite for price 
stickiness to be an equilibrium. Pursuing this argument, it might be advanced that there should exist 
a positive relationship between the degree of market power, on the one hand, and the degree of 
price stickiness, on the other hand. This seems to be the force which is at work in the model of 
Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004), who find that more competition increases the responsiveness 
of wages and prices to market conditions and therefore improves macroeconomic management. 
 
Other papers however stress that more competition makes an individual firm more reluctant to 
adjust its price relative to the prices of other firms. In other words, more competition increases the 
degree of real rigidity and can therefore lead to less frequent price adjustments. The relationship 
between the degree of competition and the degree of price rigidity is discussed in more detail in 
Asplund and Friberg (1998). They tend to find that the first force prevails, but it might well be the 
case that the relationship between competition and price rigidity is non-monotonic. In an 
environment of state-dependent pricing, Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) indeed find such a non-
monotonicity in the relationship between the elasticity of demand, on the one hand, and the degree 
of monetary non-neutrality, on the other hand. 
 
It is also important to point out that in this environment price stickiness leads to mark-up variations 
and, as such, becomes a source of output variability, apart from the output variability which results 
from shifts in the real marginal costs schedule
7. When prices prove to be sticky in the short run, 
variations in marginal costs indeed drive a wedge between actual mark-ups and "desired" mark-
ups, the latter being the mark-ups which the firms apply as a result of their optimisation programme 
when they reset their price. Without price stickiness, prices are re-optimised and reset on a 
                                                           
7  See Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Goodfriend and King (1997) on the role of mark-up variations as sources of 
output fluctuations.  
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continuous basis and mark-ups are always at their desired level. When trying to measure the 
degree of market power, one is interested in these desired mark-ups rather than in actual mark-ups. 
 
This notion of desired mark-ups is embedded in the specific wording of the first statement of 
question A9, by referring explicitly to a completely self-determined profit margin rather than referring 
to a profit margin in more general terms. The more intuitive wording profit margin and costs was 
used instead of their theoretical counterparts mark-up and marginal costs, as the pilot study pointed 
out that the respondents of the survey found this more technical terminology hard to understand. 
Question A9 only tests whether mark-up pricing is applicable; it does not test whether desired mark-
ups are variable, either as a result of the price decision of the individual firm itself, as in Kimball 
(1995), or because of cyclical variations in desired mark-ups which are uniform for all firms. 
Similarly, question A6 tries to obtain one single measure (i.e. average over the business cycle) of 
the price elasticity of demand. 
 
For at least three reasons, the (important) question whether the price elasticity of demand and the 
desired mark-ups vary over the business cycle is not addressed directly in the survey. First, 
replacing the technical concepts mark-up and marginal costs by the more intuitive terms profit 
margin and costs is far more problematic when addressing the issue of cyclical variability. Indeed, 
the nature of the cyclicality may differ, as procyclical marginal costs and counter-cyclical mark-ups 
may go hand in hand with counter-cyclical average costs per unit and procyclical profits in the 
presence of fixed costs. Second, addressing this issue directly would have implied that respondents 
would have had to break down the overall variation in their mark-ups in (i) a fraction which is due to 
variations in desired mark-ups and (ii) a fraction which is the result of price stickiness. Third, on the 
basis of the pilot study, we had strong indications that pursuing the questionnaire in those more 
technical terms might have a detrimental impact on both the number and the quality of the 
responses.  
 
Therefore, we decided to address the issue in an indirect way, namely by including in question B4 
regarding the factors which hamper price adjustment several statements which describe a situation 
in which the elasticity of demand is procyclical and/or the (desired) mark-up is counter-cyclical. If 




The questionnaire contains several questions trying to capture either the degree of competition or, 
alternatively, the degree of market power, which is the inverse of the first. 
 
In question A4, firms are asked to indicate the number of competitors. 43 p.c. of firms operate on a 
market with 5 to 20 competitors, while the figure of those with less than 5 and more than 20 
competitors is more or less equal (28  p.c. and 29  p.c.). The number of firms with more than 12  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
20 competitors is lowest in the industrial sector (16 p.c.) and highest in services to enterprises and 
construction (45 p.c. in both sectors). This is probably an indication that industrial companies are 
big players rather than a sign that the degree of competition is lower in industry. Overall, the 
information on the number of competitors clearly deviates from a situation of perfect competition. 
 
 





  Industry Construction  Trade  Services  to 
enterprises 
Total 
None 3.1  1.9  2.2  4.9  3.1 
Less than 5  31.1  10.9 24.2  21.8  24.7 
Between 5 and 20  49.8  43.6  47.6  28.3  43.1 
More than 20  16.0  43.6 26.1  45.0  29.1 
Total 100  100  100  100  100 





The question on the elasticity of demand (question A6) was apparently the most difficult to answer, 
as the response rate is slightly below 50 p.c., and 23 p.c. of the firms state that a 10 p.c. price 
increase would entail a turnover decrease of less than 10 p.c., implying an elasticity of demand of 
less than unity, which in theoretical models is its lower bound. This probably has to do with the fact 
that respondents have different horizons in mind as the short-term effect of an increase in the firm's 
relative price may be lower than its long-term equilibrium effect. 
 
The median fall in turnover is 35 p.c. and the distribution of the answers to question A6 is skewed to 
the right, as the mean fall in turnover (40 p.c.) is somewhat in excess of the median. Overall, these 
findings - having been converted into quantities demanded - imply an average elasticity of demand 
of 4.5. A similar magnitude is found by Fabiani et al. (2004). An elasticity of 4.5 implies a mark-up of 
1.29, compared to 1.35 for the euro area in Bayoumi et al. (2004) and 1.1 in Galí et al. (2001). Only 
a limited number of firms report an elasticity of demand which is close to the situation of perfect 
competition (an infinite elasticity of demand), as the 95th percentile firm still reports an elasticity of 
demand below 10. Elasticity is highest in construction and industry and lowest in trade. However, 
when a Chi-square test of equality of sectoral distributions is conducted, these sectoral differences 
are not significant at the 5 p.c. level (see appendix D).  
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Table  6  - Question A6 - By what percentage would the turnover of your main product fall if you 




% turnover fall  Industry  Construction  Trade  Services to 
enterprises 
Total 
        
0 - 10 p.c.  12.0  10.6 24.7  33.9  22.7 
11 - 25 p.c.  19.5  11.2 26.6  18.1  21.6 
26 - 50 p.c.  26.9  30.0 32.2  27.8  29.4 
51 - 75 p.c.  14.7  11.6 5.4  12.0  10.1 
76 - 100 p.c.  26.9  36.6 11.2  8.1  16.2 
Total 100  100  100  100  100 
p.m. response rate  53.3 49.9  43.7 46.2  47.1 
Average percentage  50.2 p.c.  57.8 p.c.  32.6 p.c.  34.9 p.c.  39.9 p.c. 
Median percentage  50.0 p.c.  54.9 p.c.  26.8 p.c.  25.0 p.c.  34.9 p.c. 





Quality seems to be the most important factor determining competitiveness, being more important 
than and significantly different from the second factor in the ranking, namely the price of the 
product. However, competitiveness also has to do with many other elements, namely long-term 
relationships with customers, delivery period, the degree of differentiation of the product, other 
factors (e.g. innovation, personal contact with customers, marketing,...) and after-sales services. 
Mean scores for all these factors exceed the neutral average score of 2.5. Overall, the image clearly 
deviates from a situation of perfect competition, in which case only the price would matter, and firms 
appear to have different margins along which they can differentiate their product and create some 
degree of market power. 
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Quality of the product  3.7 3.5  3.6 3.7    3.7   
Price of the product  3.6 3.6  3.3 3.3    3.4   
Long-term relationship with customers 3.0  2.9  3.1 3.2    3.1   
Delivery period  3.2  2.9  2.8  2.9   2.9  
Degree of differentiation  2.9 2.6  3.0 2.8  2.9   
Other factors  2.8  2.7 3.0  2.6  2.8   
After-sales service  2.6 2.9  3.0 2.7  2.8   
p.m. response rate (excl. other factors) 98.4  97.0 97.0  96.4  97.2   
          
 
Source: NBB. 
1  The dotted lines indicate that a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis that the statements immediately above 
and below the line have the same overall importance at the 5% level of significance. 
 
 
Question A9 on price-setting methods gives us some further indications on the market power of 
Belgian firms. Although the average score of firms responding that they set their price fully 
according to their costs and a completely self-determined profit margin (3.0) is not much higher than 
the average score of firms responding that they set their price according to the price of their main 
competitor(s), implying that they do not determine their profit margin themselves (2.8), the 
importance attached to each possibility differs at the 5 p.c. level of significance. At the level of the 
individual firms, there exists a negative correlation (0.29), between the scores obtained for both 
statements of question A9, which is, given the large number of firms, significantly different from 
zero. This correlation is, however, relatively low in economic terms, indicating that firms had 
difficulties in clearly expressing a preference in favour of one of the two statements. Nevertheless, 
the results obtained tend to suggest that, on average and to a small extent, Belgian firms are rather 
price-makers than price-takers. The latter is, however, far less so in the industrial sector, where 
both statements get the same average score.  
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We set our price fully according to our 
costs and a completely self-determined 
profit margins 
2.9 3.5  3.0  3.1    3.0   
          
We set our price according to the price of 
our main competitor(s), meaning that we 
do not determine our profit margin 
ourselves 
2.9 2.6  2.8  2.7  2.8   
          
p.m. response rate  95.5 82.0  89.6  93.3  91.8   
 
Source: NBB. 
1  The dotted line indicates that a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis that the statements immediately above 




3. PRICING-TO-MARKET (PTM) 
 
In the context of the very open Belgian economy, over 70 p.c. of turnover of the industrial sector 
being generated on foreign markets, the main market is probably not the only important market for 
many industrial firms. This is why we added part C to the questionnaire, asking whether or not there 
is a different price-setting behaviour according to the market. If such a differentiated behaviour 
appears to be relevant, this would provide an additional indication that the environment in which 
Belgian firms operate in clearly deviates from the competitive paradigm. 
 
 





  Industry 
Price in euro is the same for all countries  32.8 
Price in euro is the same for euro area countries and not the same for non-euro area countries  8.8 
Price in euro is different for all countries  58.4 
Total  100 
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Almost 60 p.c. of industrial firms do apply some form of PTM, which is a high percentage in view of 
the fact that a common currency is used inside the euro area and that most of Belgian exports are 
intended for euro area countries
8. To those firms answering that they apply PTM, we put the 
question which factors play a role in this differentiated price-setting behaviour. 
 
 








Price of competitor(s) on the market   3.4  
Other factors   2.9  
Cyclical fluctuations in demand on the market  2.5  
Structural market conditions on the market  2.5  
Exchange rate of the currency used for payment   2.4  
Rules on the market   2.1  
Tax system on the market  1.6  
p.m. response rate (excl. other factors)  94.7  
 
Source: NBB. 
1  The dotted lines indicate that a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis that the statements immediately above 
and below the line have the same overall importance at the 5% level of significance. 
 
 
The highest factor in the ranking is the price of competitor(s) on the market. Then follow "other 
factors", often specified as transportation costs, insurance costs, commissions paid,  ... Next in 
ranking and showing similar average scores are cyclical differences in local demand, structural 
market conditions (e.g. differences in taste, living standard,...) and exchange rate movements. 
Different regulations on the respective markets come next. The least important factor in the decision 
to apply PTM seems to be the tax system. A quick check reveals that consumer-oriented firms (they 
can be selected from the answers to question A5, presented in table 4) value this option higher, as 
to these firms the impact of differences in indirect taxation is certainly more direct. 
 
 
                                                           
8  74 p.c. of industrial turnover generated on foreign markets stems from euro area countries.  
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Table 11 -  Question C3 - Is competition for your main product stronger on the foreign market than on 






Yes  57.4 
No  39.8 
We do not operate on the Belgian market  2.8 
Total  100 





In question C3 firms are asked whether or not competition is stronger on the foreign market than on 
Belgian markets. Nearly 60 p.c. of firms answer that this is the case, while 40 p.c. declare that there 
is no difference in the degree of competition. Overall, this seems to indicate that, on average, firms 
have some more market power on the domestic market, despite the fact that the Belgian market is a 
very open one, there not being any barriers to trade, and that foreign companies are indeed very 
active on it. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE MEASURES OF COMPETITION AND MARKET POWER 
 
Several measures of the degree of competition or, alternatively, the degree of market power have 
been presented above and another one will be dealt with when discussing the results of question 
B3, testing the impact of competitors' price(s) on the decision to increase or decrease the price. The 
coherence between these different measures is great, as companies with more than 20 competitors 
have a higher elasticity of demand compared with companies without any competitor; they rank the 
statement that their price is set according to the price of the main competitor higher and they attach 
more importance to the competitors' price(s) in the decision to increase/decrease their price or to 
apply pricing-to-market. 
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Table 12 - Coherence between measures of competition 
 
(average scores, except where mentioned) 
 
 
A4 - Number of competitors 
  None  More than 20 
A6 - Average turnover fall  9.7%  49.8% 
A9 - Price is set according to the price of the main competitor 2.1  2.7 
B3 - Importance of competitors' price in     
price increase  1.6  2.3 
price decrease  1.7  2.7 





Summarising part III, the market the responding firms operate on for their main product (which is 
representative of the firm) is mainly the Belgian market. Firms in the industrial sector and in the 
sector services to enterprises do have a considerable amount of long-term relationships with other 
firms. The two other sectors participating in the survey, namely construction and particularly trade, 
are more consumer-oriented. Although firms undoubtedly operate in a competitive environment, the 
reported results clearly deviate from a situation of perfect competition. They also tend to deviate 
from the situation of monopolistic competition underlying most macro-models and are more 
suggestive of oligopolistic market structures. To a small extent, firms seem to be rather 
price-makers than price-takers and, besides product quality, many elements (long-term 
relationships with customers, product differentiation, ...) allow them to gain some degree of market 
power. PTM is applied by the majority of industrial firms and prices differ between markets for many 
reasons (competitors' price, cyclical demand conditions,...). Finally, there is some evidence that the 
industrial sector operates in the most competitive environment (higher elasticity of demand, more 
price-takership, more importance attached to competitor's prices for own price increase/decrease) 
and for this sector the degree of competition seems to be a bit more pronounced on foreign markets 
than on the domestic market. 
 
Overall, it appears that deviations from perfect competition are substantial and, therefore, conditions 
are met to make the pricing decision of a firm meaningful. Several features of this pricing decision 
are highlighted in the next sections. 
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IV.  WHEN ARE PRICES ADJUSTED? 
 
The price-adjustment process consists of two components. In the first stage, firms have to run their 
profit maximisation program in order to determine the price they want to set, given all the relevant 
information they have. This component of the price-adjustment process will be referred to as the 
price-reviewing stage. As this process entails costs, firms may not evaluate their price on a 
continuous basis, it thus being relevant to examine the frequency of price reviews. Firms then check 
whether this optimal price corresponds to the price they currently charge. If the price-reviewing 
shows that a change is necessary, the price may actually be changed, although this is not always 
the case. Price reviews and price changes do not necessarily coincide and the former will probably 
occur more frequently, as actual price changes may entail additional specific costs. This second 
component of the price adjustment is referred to as the price-changing stage and it is meaningful to 
examine the frequency of price changes, in addition to the analysis of the frequency of price 
reviews. Moreover, whereas price reviews can take place at regular intervals, this is in general not 
the case for the price-changing stage. Hence, investigating whether the price-adjustment process is 
time-dependent or state-dependent has to take place in the first stage of the process, i.e. for the 
reviewing rather than for the changing of prices. For these reasons, part B of the questionnaire 
deals with both aspects of the price-adjustment process. 
 
1. REVIEWING PRICES 
 
1.1  Time-dependent versus state-dependent price-setting behaviour 
 
In the relevant literature a distinction is made between time-dependent and state-dependent price-
setting behaviour. Time-dependent models refer to the fact that the timing of price adjustment is 
exogenously given. In other words, it does not depend on the state of the economy. The most well-
known time-dependent pricing rules are those of Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980). In the first case, 
the interval between two consecutive price adjustments is random (but exogenous), while in the 
second case prices are adjusted after fixed intervals. Under a state-dependent pricing rule, the price 
will be adjusted when a specific event occurs, causing a deviation of the current price from the 
optimal price which is large enough to make up for the costs of the adjustment. Many macro-models 
assume time-dependent price adjustment - often à la Calvo -, as this yields more tractable models 
than state-dependent adjustment. 
 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked when they review their price and they were offered 
the possibility to choose between the options: "at specific time intervals" (which we interpret as 
time-dependent), "in reaction to specific events" (which we interpret as state-dependent), and 
"mainly at specific time intervals, but also in reaction to specific events" (which we interpret as 
predominantly time-dependent, but switching to state-dependent if sufficiently important events 20  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
occur). The specific wording of our time-dependent option "at specific time intervals" is probably 
closer to Taylor than to Calvo. 
 
 





  Normal conditions  Specific events 
Time-dependent price-setting 
  Industry 
  Construction 
  Trade 













  Industry 
  Construction 
  Trade 













Sources: Apel et al., NBB. 
(..) Swedish results. 
Response rate Belgium: 94 p.c. 
Response rate Sweden: 92 p.c. 
 
 
Purely time-dependent reviewing (i.e. always, even when specific events occur) is practised by 
26 p.c. of Belgian firms, while 34 p.c. use purely state-dependent reviewing (i.e. always, even under 
normal conditions). For 40 p.c. of firms the process is normally time-dependent but it may shift to 
state-dependency, if specific events occur. Hence, under normal circumstances, most firms 
(66  p.c.) adopt time-dependent reviewing. However, when a significant event occurs, 40  p.c. of 
firms will shift to state-dependent price-reviewing, implying that 74 p.c. of firms will adopt state-
dependent behaviour, whereas only 26  p.c. will continue to review their price at regular time 
intervals. 
 
Evidence on the existence of both time-dependent and state-dependent price-setting behaviour in 
the micro prices underlying the Belgian CPI has been found by Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004a) 
and (2004b). Moreover, the Belgian survey results on this issue are very much in line with the 
Swedish results of Apel et al. (2001), although they tend to show somewhat more time-dependence 
under normal conditions. Moreover, the fraction of state-dependent firms is far more pronounced 
than the breakdown which was found in Knelow and Kryvtsov (2004) - roughly 10  p.c. of the 
variance of US CPI-inflation stemming from state-dependent factors and 90 p.c. stemming from 
time-dependent factors -, in which case the dynamics of a mixed model do not differ much from 
those of a purely time-dependent model. Finally, the fact that a substantial fraction of firms can 
switch from time-dependent towards state-dependent pricing suggests that not only the nature and  
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the direction of the shock, but also its magnitude may matter for understanding the reaction of 
prices. 
 
Overall, this evidence sheds a different light on the macro-models used nowadays, as they 
generally assume time-dependent price adjustment. Wolman (1999) illustrates the impact for the 
dynamics of inflation of the time-dependency hypothesis of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) relative 
to the state-dependency of Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999). The question which type of specific 
events (aggregate, sectoral or purely idiosyncratic shocks at the firm level) is underlying the 
state-dependent aspects of the price-reviewing process was not addressed by the survey. 
 
1.2  Frequency of price reviews 
 
Firms which indicated that they review their price at specific time intervals (always or when no 
specific events occur) were asked how often they do so. Almost 60 p.c. review prices once a year. 
The second most important frequency is two times a year (20 p.c.), followed by quarterly reviews 
(6 p.c.) and once every two years (5 p.c.). The number of price reviews mentioned in the answer to 
question B1b was used to calculate the implied duration, expressed in months, between two 
consecutive reviews. Overall, the average duration between two consecutive price reviews is 
10  months. These average intervals between reviews are longest in services to enterprises 
(12 months) and shortest in construction (7 months). Industry and trade show somewhat shorter 
durations between two consecutive price reviews than the average (9.6 and 9.7  months 
respectively) and retail adopts even shorter durations (9 months). 
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Table 14 - Question B1b - Frequency of price reviews: turnover-weighted results 
(percentages) 
 
 Industry  Construction  Trade  Services  to 
enterprises 
Total  p.m. implied 
duration 
More than once a year  35.3  57.7  47.2  18.3  35.8   
365 times (daily)  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1/30 
364 - 53 times  0.2  1.5  0.0  0.6  0.3  1/30 - 1/4 
52 times (weekly)  0.6  0.0  1.1  0.0  0.6  1/4 
51 - 13 times  0.8  2.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  1/4 - 1 
12 times (monthly)  5.4 6.2  0.7  1.9  2.7  1 
11 - 7 times  0.0  2.8  1.1  0.0  0.6  1 - 2 
6 times  1.4  2.5  0.0  0.6  0.7  2 
5 times  0.8  3.2  0.0  0.0  0.4  2 - 3 
4 times (quarterly)  9.7  16.3  2.9  4.4  5.9  3 
3 times   3.0  4.8  4.9  2.6  3.7  4 
2 times (every half year)  13.4  17.7  35.9  7.5   20.2  6 
Once a year  59.3  37.0  49.4  71.7   58.3  12 
Less than once a year  5.3  5.3  3.3  10.0  6.0   
Every two years  4.3 4.6  1.7  8.2  4.5 24 
Every three years  0.8 0.6  1.7  0.6  1.1 36 
Less than every three years 0.2  0.0  0.0 1.2  0.4 >36 
Total 100  100  100  100  100   
Average duration  9.6 7.2  9.7  11.7  10.2   





1.3  Synchronisation of yearly price reviews 
 
Firms which specified that they review their price once a year, were also asked in which month this 
typically happens. For those firms (nearly 60 p.c. of the firms declaring to have a predominantly 
time-dependent process of price reviews, see table 14) there seems to be a considerable degree of 
synchronisation among firms, as 43  p.c. of them carry out yearly price reviews in January. 
December is indicated by 9 p.c. of firms and March by 8 p.c. of the respondents. The other months 
represent shares below 5  p.c. The high degree of synchronisation of price reviews in services 
during the month of January (58 p.c.) is conspicuous. This result for services was also found in the 
analysis of the Belgian micro CPI data by Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004a). 
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1.4  Information used when reviewing prices 
 
As already emphasised, a question was inserted as to the information set the price reviews are 
based on (questions B2a and B2b), since deviations from a fully optimising behaviour can be an 
additional source of sluggishness in the response of inflation to shocks, for instance as a result of 
rule of thumb price setters as in Galí et al. (2001), as a result of indexation schemes as in 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) or Smets and Wouters (2003), or as a result of 
stickiness in either the information gathering and/or the optimisation processes as in Mankiw and 
Reiss (2002).  
 
It is important to stress that this particular question explicitly refers to the last price review. We 
indeed learned from the pilot study that it is not obvious to ask firms about their behaviour in this 
respect in more general or structural terms, as it is possible that they apply a rule of thumb for some 
period of time and then occasionally shift to optimal price-setting when they realise that the price 
they charge is too much out of line. From a theoretical point of view as well, it is hard to justify that 
firms always deviate from optimal price-setting and apply rules of thumb on a permanent basis and, 
indeed, non-optimal price-setting is not modeled this way in the above-mentioned models. As a 
result, the answers to question B2a and B2b can provide some indication as to the overall 
importance of rule of thumb behaviour in the economy, but is not very informative as to the 
importance of this behaviour at the level of the individual firm, making a meaningful distinction 
between firms for which rule of thumb behaviour is important and firms for which optimal price-
setting is important impossible. 
 
The last price review was carried out in an optimal way for only one third of firms, meaning that the 
price-reviewing process took into account a wide range of information relevant for the profit 
maximisation of the firm and that this information was related to both the present and the future 
economic context. Another 30 p.c. occupies a more intermediate position, as a wide range of data 
was indeed used, though this  information was confined to the present economic context. Finally, a 
rule of thumb (e.g. indexation based on the consumer price index, a fixed amount/percentage 
adaptation,...) was used by 37 p.c. of firms. Overall, this answer provides evidence in favour of a 
substantial degree of non-optimal price-setting, suggesting that this type of informational friction 
could be an important source of sluggishness in the inflation process. 
 
Price-setting behaviour is more optimal in industry, 45  p.c. of firms basing their price-reviewing 
process on a wide range of information which is also forward-looking. This somewhat more 
competitive sector is surely subject to more pressure to set its prices in an optimal way than other 
sectors. The use of rule of thumbs is most pronounced in the sector services to enterprises. 
However, the results of a Chi-Square test (see appendix D) do not reject the null hypothesis of 
equality of sectoral distributions at the 5 p.c. level of significance. 
 24  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
 





  Industry Construction  Trade Services  to 
enterprises 
Total 
We have applied a rule of thumb 28.7  35.8  35.0  46.1  36.6 
We have considered a wide range of information  71.3  64.2 65.0  53.9  63.4 
  related to the present context 26.6  38.5  34.6 22.9  29.4 
  related to the present and the future context  44.7  25.7 30.4  30.9  34.0 
Total 100  100  100  100  100 





2. CHANGING PRICES 
 
In accordance with Belgian micro CPI data (see Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004)) and with the 
findings of Apel et al. (2001) for Sweden and Fabiani et al. (2004) for Italy, prices do not change 
frequently. 55 p.c. of firms change their price once a year, while 18 p.c. do so even less often, the 
remaining 27 p.c. of firms changing their price more than once a year. This implies that the average 
duration between two consecutive price changes is almost 13 months, being highest in services to 
enterprises (15 months) and lowest in construction (10 months). Similar to the results on price 
reviews, the average duration is somewhat lower in industry and trade (close to 12 months) and 
retail shows even shorter durations between two consecutive price changes (11 months). As retail 
is mainly consumer-oriented, this would suggest that consumer prices are more flexible than 
producer prices. Dias et al. (2004) came to the same conclusion.  
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  Industry Construction  Trade  Services  to 
enterprises 
Total  p.m. 
implied 
duration 
More than once a year  29.0  40.6  33.3  10.8  26.6   
365 times (daily)  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1/30 
364 - 53 times  0.0  1.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  1/30 - 1/4 
52 times (weekly)  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.2  1/4 
51 - 13 times   0.9  2.9  0.7  0.8  0.9  1/4 - 1 
12 times (monthly)  2.3 4.1  0.4  0.4  1.1  1 
11 - 7 times  2.0  2.2  1.2  0.4  1.2  1 - 2 
6 times  1.0  2.1  0.3  0.0  0.5  2 
5 times  0.6  3.1  0.9  0.5  0.8  2 - 3 
4 times (quarterly)  5.4  8.8  2.3  1.7  3.3  3 
3 times  5.3  6.7  4.5  2.9  4.4  4 
2 times (every half year)  10.0  9.6  22.8  3.7  13.6  6 
Once a year   51.2  47.3  52.8  63.9  55.1  12 
Less than once a year  19.8 12.1  13.9  25.2  18.4  
Every two years  14.1 9.4  9.5  14.7  12.1  24 
Every three years  3.8 2.0  3.5  4.9  3.8  36 
Less than every three years 1.7  0.4  0.7  5.2  2.1  >36 
Total 100  100  100  100  100   
Average duration  11.9 9.8  12.0  15.3  12.8   





3. PRICE REVIEWS VERSUS PRICE CHANGES 
 
When comparing the frequency of the price-reviewing process with the frequency of the price-
changing process for the firms the survey allows such a comparison for (i.e. the firms that indicated 
that their price-reviewing process is time-dependent in question B1a and thus answered the 
questions both on the frequency of reviews and the frequency of changes), it appears that prices 
are reviewed more frequently than they are changed. The average duration between two 
consecutive reviews is 10 months, while the average duration between two price changes is 12 
months
9. This evidence is consistent with the fact that changing a price entails costs, although it is 
theoretically also possible that the price-reviewing process would show that no price change was 
necessary. Given the length of the interval between two consecutive reviews -  10  months on 
average - we do not think, however, that the latter possibility is a very realistic one. Moreover, there 
appears to exist a positive correlation between both phenomena, firms with a short duration 
between two consecutive price reviews also showing a short duration between two consecutive 
                                                           
9   The average duration between two price changes for the group of firms with a time-dependent price-reviewing behaviour 
responding to question B1b is somewhat lower than for the whole sample of firms responding to question B5, namely 
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price changes and vice versa. Finally, only a few firms report a review frequency which is lower than 
the frequency of changing prices.  
 
 
Table 17 - Duration of prices 
 




<=1  > 1 and < 12  12  >12 
<=1  31 12  8  1 
> 1 and < 12  1 197  72  21 
12  2 15  436  37 
> 12  0 1  5  51 
 
Source: NBB. 
duration <=1 : price is changed/reviewed monthly or more frequently. 
duration > 1 and < 12 : price is changed/reviewed with a frequency from one month up to one year. 
duration = 12 : price is changed /reviewed once a year. 




V.  WHY ARE PRICES STICKY? 
 
In question B4 of the survey firms are offered a list of theories on price rigidities and are asked to 
state the importance of each of them in their firm. The response rate was high (94 p.c. on average), 
although this is a difficult question. First, it is not easy to find the appropriate formulation for the 
different theories in order to make them comprehensible for firms. Second, as we intended, for the 
reasons explained above, to test theories on both nominal and real rigidities, the list became very 
long. Survey results are indeed probably the only source of information on the basis of which it is 
possible to get an answer to the question whether the infrequent adjustment of prices is due to the 
existence of price-adjustment costs (nominal rigidities) or to the fact that the frictionless real (or 
relative) price (defined as a desired mark-up over real marginal costs) does not change 
substantially when aggregate output changes (real rigidities). To a large extent the list of theories on 
real rigidities was inspired by Romer (2001) and can be divided into three groups: theories with 
respect to a flat real marginal costs curve, counter-cyclical movements in desired mark-ups and 
counter-cyclical shifts in the real marginal costs curve. The formulation of the theories into "survey 
language" was mainly based on the research undertaken by Apel et al. (2001). 
  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005  27 
1. RANKING OF THE THEORIES IN BELGIUM 
 












Implicit contracts (no 4) N  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.6  2.5   
Explicit contracts (no 1) N  2.9  2.9  1.8  2.7  2.4   
Sluggish costs / constant marginal 
costs (no 7) 
R/A 2.3  2.6  2.4 2.5    2.4   
Importance of fixed costs / liquidity 
constraints (no 6) 
R/B 2.2  2.4  2.2 2.2    2.2   
Kinked demand curve / coordination 
failure (no 5) 
R/B 2.4  2.0  2.3 2.0  2.2   
Shifting customer clientele (no 11) R/B  1.9  2.1  2.2 2.1    2.1   
Thick-market demand (no 8)  R/B 2.0  1.9  2.3 1.8    2.0   
Judging quality by price (no 14) N  1.7  1.9  2.1  2.0    1.9   
Thick-market supply (no 9) R/C  1.7  1.8  1.9 1.7  1.8   
Risk to have to readjust price in the 
opposite direction (no 13) 
N 1.8  1.6  1.8  1.7    1.8   
Changing non-price elements 
(no 15) 
N 1.9  2.0  1.6  1.6    1.7   
Counter-cyclical costs of finance 
(no 10) 
R/C 1.6  1.8  1.7 1.7  1.7   
Pricing thresholds (no 12) N  1.4  1.6  2.0  1.6  1.7   
Information-gathering costs / 
bureaucratic rigidities (no 3) 
N 1.6  1.7  1.6  1.6    1.6   
Physical menu costs (no 2) N  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.4  1.5   
            
p.m. response rate    94.2 93.3  88.9  93.8  91.9   
 
Source: NBB. 
1  The dotted lines indicate that a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis that the statements immediately above 
and below the line have the same overall importance at the 5% level of significance. 
(no ): corresponding sequence in the list of theories in the questionnaire (question B4). 
N: nominal  rigidity. 
R/A:  real rigidity/flat real marginal costs curve. 
R/B: real  rigidity/counter-cyclical movements in desired mark-ups. 
R/C: real  rigidity/counter-cyclical shifts in the real marginal costs curve. 
 
 
As respondents were asked to indicate the importance of each theory in their firm, a ranking of the 
theories could be made on the basis of the turnover-weighted average scores. They are presented 
in descending order in table 18. The dotted lines indicate that a Wilcoxon signed rank test reveals 
that the overall importance attached to the theory above the line is significantly higher than the 
importance attached to the theory below the line. 
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Firms attach the greatest importance to two theories on nominal rigidities. First, there is the theory 
on implicit contracts, being formulated as "our customers prefer a stable price and a change could 
damage customer relations, even if our competitors also change their price". The emphasis put on 
the fact that competitors may also change their price, is inspired by Apel et al. (2001) and is meant 
to make a distinction between the real theory on the kinked demand curve which deals with lower or 
higher relative prices. Hence, the theory on implicit contracts can more readily be classified as a 
nominal one, although this choice is not obvious, as explained in Blinder et al. (1998)
10. In the 
ranking, the implicit contract theory is immediately followed by the theory on explicit contracts, 
under which the existence of a written contract implies that the price can only be changed if the 
contract is renegotiated. The importance of implicit or explicit contracts is consistent with the results 
of the answers to question A5 (see table 4), firms answering in that respect that a substantial 
fraction of their turnover (more than 40 p.c. on average) is realised with companies they have some 
kind of long-term relationship with. This fraction amounts to 60  p.c. in industry and services to 
enterprises and in these sectors, the scores for the theories or implicit and explicit contracts are 
above the average. 
 
A similar mean score is attained for the theory on real rigidities with respect to the flat real marginal 
costs curve, also called "sluggish costs" and represented by the statement "our variable costs do 
not change much over the business cycle, which contributes to the price of our product remaining 
roughly the same". Real marginal costs may be flat - meaning that they show no explicit cyclical 
movements - because of real wages showing almost no procyclical movements or because of a 
flexible organisation of the production process, as in Dotsey and King (2001). 
 
The next four theories in the ranking have to do with the counter-cyclical character of the desired 
mark-up. As explained earlier, the related question refers to the "desired" mark-ups, as opposed to 
counter-cyclical movements in mark-ups caused by nominal rigidities. The impact of these nominal 
frictions was indeed ignored here and the theories were formulated in such a way that they only test 
whether or not desired mark-ups change over the business cycle. As variation in desired mark-ups 
is studied as a source of price rigidity, we typically concentrated on counter-cyclical movements in 
mark-ups. In contrast, procyclical mark-ups would be an additional incentive to change prices over 
the business cycle. 
 
The first theory of this group of four pertains to the importance of fixed costs or liquidity constraints, 
which we consider as one and the same. It states that a reduced cash flow during a recession may 
induce a firm to keep the price up (hence increasing the mark-up) in order to have sufficient 
liquidities at its disposal. In fact, it combines two elements. The first assumption is that it takes some 
time before a price decrease results in a higher turnover, as customers only gradually respond to 
price changes. The second element is that capital market imperfections create liquidity constraints, 
                                                           
10  Blinder et al. (1998) p 150.  
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the latter resulting from a reduced cash flow combined with a (substantial) part of the costs 
remaining fixed in the meantime. Evidence from the supermarket industry in support of this theory 
was found by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996).  
 
Next is the theory on coordination failure or kinked demand curve, stating that firms are reluctant to 
be the first to adapt a price. If they raise their (relative) price, they expect competitors not to follow 
suit and market shares will be lost. If they cut their (relative) price, they are afraid to start a process 
resulting in all market participants eventually to be worse off. The kinked demand curve this 
produces, is an extreme case of a broader class of models in which the elasticity of demand is a 
(positive) function of a firm’s real or relative price. In line with Kimball (1995), Eichenbaum and 
Fisher (2004) introduce this type of real rigidity in their model in order to reduce the amount of 
nominal rigidity which is necessary to produce inflation dynamics being consistent with US data. As 
a result of changes in the real price of the individual firm, the aggregate elasticity of demand 
becomes procyclical and the aggregate desired mark-up counter-cyclical. The next two theories 
produce counter-cyclical variations in desired mark-ups which are uniform for all firms. 
 
The theory labeled "shifting customer clientele" suggests that firms have both loyal customers with 
low price elasticities and occasional customers with higher price elasticities. As the first group of 
customers remains during a recession, the price elasticity is lower during recessions than during 
boom periods and, hence, mark-ups move counter-cyclically. An overview of research on this issue 
is provided by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
11. 
 
The last theory on counter-cyclical movements in mark-ups has to do with thick-market effects on 
the demand side. It states that when customers buy a lot, they have more interest in comparing 
prices than when they do not buy a lot. Thus, the elasticity of demand is higher in boom periods, 
which tends to keep prices down through a reduction in mark-ups. Empirical evidence on this theory 
was found by Warner and Barsky (1995). They conclude that a significant number of markdowns 
are timed to occur when shopping intensity is exogenously high. 
 
Overall, we find that the four theories which give rise to counter-cyclical movements in desired 
mark-ups rank relatively high and that this type of real rigidity, not taken on board in the standard 
class of macro-models, may be an important source of sluggishness in the reaction of both output 
and prices to shocks. 
 
The eighth theory in the ranking is only applicable to price decreases and states that firms might 
fear that customers will mistake price cuts for reductions in quality. This theory is often put forward 
as a theory to justify specific downward nominal rigidities. 
 
                                                           
11  Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) pp 1119-1120. 30  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
Besides thick-market effects on the demand side, similar effects on the supply side may induce 
firms not to change prices, as during economic booms the costs for reaching customers are smaller, 
which keeps the price down. Hence, this theory suggests counter-cyclical shifts in the real marginal 
costs curve, in view of the existence of economies of scale. 
 
Next in the ranking are two theories on nominal rigidities. The first states that a firm might consider 
not to change its price because it believes that it soon will have to readjust it in the opposite 
direction. The second argues that an increase in demand can be met by other elements than a price 
increase, e.g. an extension of the delivery period.  
 
The theory ranked twelfth pertains to the counter-cyclical cost of finance. It is based on the idea that 
capital-market imperfections raise the cost of external finance in recessions. This contributes to 
keeping marginal costs, and thus prices, up in a downturn.  
 
The remaining three theories on nominal rigidities show the lowest ranking. The use of pricing 
thresholds may hamper price changes, unless the firm can switch directly to another attractive 
price, which can be a round price (ending with "0" or "5") or a so-called psychological price (ending 
with "9"). 
 
A somewhat surprising phenomenon is that also the two remaining theories on costs linked to price 
adjustment, namely "information-gathering costs" and "physical menu costs" obtain relatively low 
scores. The low ranking of information-gathering costs seems to suggest that pricing frictions show 
predominantly in the price-changing process rather than in the information-gathering and price-
reviewing process. This result contrasts somewhat with our finding that the price-reviewing process 
occurred relatively infrequently and with the fact that it was not always based on a complete 
information set. However, both results could be coherent if the relatively low information gathering 
costs which firms declare refer to the limited subset of information which is used in case of non-
optimal price-setting. At the same time, the price-adjustment costs which are predominantly put 
forward in the literature - i.e. the menu costs -, are also ranked very low. This has probably to do 
with the narrow interpretation we placed on the menu costs theory, confining them to "physical" 
costs, whereas in the relevant macro-literature, menu costs are rather a sort of short-cut for a wide 
range of (fixed) price-adjustment costs. 
 
The ranking of the theories is very similar across sectors, with two exceptions. The lower 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient for the trade sector (see appendix D) relative to other 
sectors, reveals a different behaviour. This is certainly the case for the importance attributed to the 
theory on explicit contracts, the mean score for the trade sector being much lower. This seems 
evident as trade is much more consumer-oriented and explicit contracts with consumers may be 
rare. Firms in the trade sector, on the contrary, rank the theory on pricing thresholds higher, as 
attractive price-setting behaviour is more widespread in this sector. Taking a closer look at the trade  
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sector, we find that both differences are even more pronounced for retail, with explicit contracts 
showing the very low average score of 1.3 and pricing thresholds getting a mean score of 2.3. For 
more details on the widespread use of attractive prices for Belgian consumer goods, we refer to 
Aucremanne and Cornille (2001) and Cornille (2003), while Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004b) and 
Álvarez and Hernando (2004) provide evidence that the use of pricing thresholds tends to coincide 
with a somewhat more sticky pricing behaviour for consumer goods. 
 
2. A COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
Even though in other countries the surveys have been conducted in different ways, the formulation 
of the theories was not similar and not the same list was tested, it is interesting to see that the five 
theories ranking highest in Belgium also get a place in the top six in the other countries. Price 
rigidities are in all countries mainly explained by implicit and explicit contracts, sluggish 
costs/constant marginal costs, liquidity constraints/importance of fixed costs and kinked demand 
curve/coordination failure. Nominal rigidities caused by information-gathering or menu costs receive 
low ranks in nearly all countries. 
 
 
Table 19 - Ranking of the different theories on nominal rigidities - weighted results 
 










Implicit contracts (no 4)  N  1  1  4  5  - 
Explicit contracts (no 1)  N  2  2  5  1  1 
Sluggish costs / constant marginal 
costs (no 7) 
R/A 3 3  2  2  - 
Importance of fixed costs / liquidity 
constraints (no 6) 
R/B 4 6  -  -  - 
Kinked demand curve / coordination 
failure (no 5) 
R/B 5 4  1  3  2 
Shifting customer clientele (no 11)  R/B  6  8  7  9  - 
Thick-market demand (no 8)  R/B  7  12  -  -  - 
Judging quality by price (no 14)  N  8  -  12  10  - 
Thick-market supply (no 9)  R/C  9  10  -  -  - 
Risk to have to readjust price in the 
opposite direction (no 13) 
N 10  -  -  -  3 
Changing non-price elements (no 15)  N  11  -  3  8  - 
Counter-cyclical cost of finance (no 10)  R/C  12  5  -  -  - 
Pricing thresholds (no 12)  N  13  7  8  4  5 
Information-gathering costs / 
bureaucratic rigidities (no 3) 
N 14 13  6  -  6 
Physical menu costs (no 2)  N  15  11  6  11  4 
 
Sources: Apel et al., Fabiani et al., Blinder et al., Hall et al., NBB. 
(..) number of theories tested. 
N: nominal  rigidity. 
R/A:  real rigidity/flat real marginal costs curve. 
R/B: real  rigidity/counter-cyclical movements in desired mark-ups. 
R/C: real  rigidity/counter-cyclical shifts in the real marginal costs curve. 32  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
 
These conclusions are confirmed by the calculation of a Spearman's rank correlation coefficient in 
order to compare, on a pair-wise basis, the ranking of the Belgian theories with the ranking in other 
countries, of course only for the theories which both have in common. This correlation coefficient 
tends to be positive and relatively high, meaning that there is a high degree of symmetry in the 
ranking of theories across countries. It amounts to 0.80 for the comparison Belgium - Sweden (12 
theories in common), 0.83 for Belgium - Italy (6 theories in common), 0.63 for Belgium - UK (9 
theories in common), whereas it is somewhat lower (0.46) for the comparison Belgium - US (10 
theories in common). 
 
Overall, these results are compatible with the recent state of the macro-literature on this issue, 
pointing that a combination of both nominal and real rigidities and the interplay between both is 
important in understanding the short-run non-neutrality of money and, more generally speaking, 
price and inflation dynamics. 
 
 
VI.  WHAT CAUSES PRICE CHANGES? 
 
How do firms react to changes in factors underlying the price-setting process and is this reaction 
different, depending on whether prices have to be increased or decreased? In question B3 firms 
were asked to indicate the importance of a list of factors inducing firms to raise or to lower their 
price and substantial differences were found between them. Cost factors (labour costs and costs of 
other inputs) seem to be the main driving force behind price increases and their mean scores are 
much higher than for other factors (often specified as exchange rate movements) and increases in 
competitors' prices. Fluctuations in demand, financial costs and productivity decreases get the 
lowest rankings. Competitors' behaviour is the predominant factor in the decision to decrease 
prices. Further, there is a group of three factors with similar mean scores, namely fluctuations in 
demand, other factors (besides exchange rate movements, often specified as "on customer 
demand") and decreases in other input costs. Labour costs, productivity increases and financial 
costs are given the lowest ranking. 
 
Sectoral differences are important for "other factors" (see the variance decomposition in appendix 
C). This is due to the special place trade holds, as "other factors" are ranked highest as the driving 
force behind price increases and price decreases. This is also the case in the retail branch. 
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Price increase         
Increase in labour costs 3.0  3.5  2.5  3.3    2.9   
Increase in other costs  3.1 2.9  2.8 2.7    2.9   
Other factors  2.3  2.6 3.2  2.2    2.6   
Increase in competitors' price 2.7  2.3  2.6  2.3    2.5   
Increase in demand  2.3 2.5  2.0 2.3    2.2   
Increase in financial costs   2.0  2.5  2.3  2.2   2.2  
Decrease in productivity 2.1  2.4  1.9  1.9  2.0   
Price decrease         
Decrease in competitors' price 3.1  2.6  3.0 2.5    2.9   
Fall in demand  2.7  2.8  2.5  2.4  2.5  
Other factors  2.5  2.1 3.1  1.5    2.4   
Decrease in other costs 2.6  2.4  2.2  2.1    2.3   
Decrease in labour costs 2.1  2.7  1.9  2.2    2.1   
Increase in productivity 2.2  2.4  1.9  2.0    2.0   
Decrease in financial costs 1.6  2.1  1.8 1.8  1.8   
          
p.m. response rate (excl. other 
factors) 
       
price increase  92.8  94.1 87.7  93.7 91.1   
price decrease  87.9  89.5 79.3  83.9 83.4   
 
Source: NBB. 
1  The dotted lines indicate that a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis that the statements 
immediately above and below the line have the same overall importance at the 5% level of significance. 
 
 
In summary, firms seems to react asymmetrically to shocks, cost factors having a greater impact 
when prices have to be increased, while competitors' prices and demand conditions play a larger 
role in decisions to decrease prices. Similar results have been found by Fabiani et al. (2004) for 
Italy and by Hall et al. (2000) for the U.K. This type of asymmetry adds to the asymmetry which was 
put forward in section IV, where it was found that, depending on the magnitude of the shock, pricing 
behaviour could shift from time-dependency to state-dependency. However, survey results of the 
question on (a)symmetrical behaviour are surrounded by some uncertainty, as the response rate 
was much higher for price increases (91 p.c.) than for price decreases (83 p.c.). Moreover, a larger 
share of firms hold a price decrease to be "unimportant", resulting in generally lower mean scores. 
This gives the impression that firms are not used to price decreases and subsequently do not 
answer the question or state that it is unimportant. Moreover, if a firm has not recently experienced 
cost decreases, it might be less likely to answer that they induce a fall in prices. As a fall in demand 
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Hence, the way question B3 has been formulated was probably not the most appropriate one to 
conclude whether or not price-setting behaviour is asymmetric. 
 
 
VII. CHARACTERISTICS  OF  FLEXIBLE VERSUS STICKY FIRMS 
 
By crossing answers to different questions, we tried to distinguish some characteristics of flexible 
firms in relation to sticky firms. Therefore, a typical flexible firm and a typical sticky firm had to be 
defined. "Flexible" were considered to be those firms with a duration between two consecutive price 
changes of less than or equal to 3  months, meaning that, on average, their price is changed 
quarterly or more frequently. Although this frequency of changing prices is in principle not 
symptomatic of a very flexible price-setting behaviour - i.e. changing prices on a continuous basis 
as in auction markets - it makes sense to concentrate on firms changing at least once every quarter, 
because this is the frequency at which flexible firms would change prices in macro-models, which 
typically are specified at quarterly frequency. It is even less obvious to define a typical “sticky” firm, 
as in principle all price-setting behaviour which differs from the flexible benchmark is to be 
considered as sticky. For the purpose of this section, the typical "sticky" firm was, however, defined 
as having a duration between two consecutive price changes exceeding 12 months, meaning that 
price changes only occur less than once a year. If a larger definition was adopted, the results were 
not very conclusive. It proved essential to drop from the analysis the large number of firms which 
change their price only once a year (as these firms have different characteristics, while they are all 
declaring the same frequency of price adjustment). 
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Table 21 - Flexible firms versus sticky firms 
 
(average scores, unless otherwise specified) 
 
  Flexible firms
1 Sticky  firms
2 
Flexible firms experience more competition    
A4 - More than 5 competitors  82%  67% 
A6 - Average turnover fall  56%  36% 
A9 - Price is set according to price of main competitor(s)  2.8     2.8    
B3 - Importance of competitors' price in      
  price increase  2.6     2.3    
  price decrease  3.0     2.6    
C2 - Importance of competitors' price in     
 pricing-to-market  3.5     3.1    
Flexible firms have less long-term relationships (A5)    
More than 50% of main customers are     
  companies within own group  6%  8% 
  companies outside own group with     
 long-term  relationship  22%  35% 
Flexible firms are slightly more export-oriented    
Turnover generated on foreign markets  46%  38% 
Optimal pricing behaviour (B2a/b)    
We have applied a rule of thumb  24%  34% 
We have considered a wide range of information  76%  66% 
  related to the present context  35%  36% 
  related to the present and future context  41%  30% 
Flexible firms hold theories on rigidities to be less important (B4)    
Theories on nominal rigidities  1.9     2.0    
Theories on real rigidities  2.1     2.1    
 
Source: NBB. 
1  Firms with an average duration between two consecutive price changes <= to 3 months. 
2  Firms with an average duration between two consecutive price changes > than 12 months. 
 
 
For several reasons, it was decided to concentrate on the price-changing process rather than on the 
price-reviewing process when applying these definitions of flexible and of sticky firms. First, the 
existence of a positive correlation between the frequency of price reviews and the frequency of 
price changes (see section IV.3) to a large extent made cross-comparisons based on both concepts 
superfluous. Second, by doing so, we concentrated on the final outcome of the price-setting 
process. Finally, as more firms had to answer the question on the frequency of price changes - only 
time-dependent price-setters having to answer the question on the frequency of price reviews - we 
chose the largest number of observations, namely 1,644 firms responding to the question on the 
frequency of price changes. By defining rather narrow cases of flexible and sticky firms, a large 
amount of information was however lost, as only 27 p.c. of firms come under one of both groups 
(9 p.c. flexible firms and 18 p.c. sticky firms).  36  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 65 - MARCH 2005 
 
The first conclusion drawn from this cross-analysis is that flexible firms tend to experience more 
competition. 82 p.c. of flexible firms have more than five competitors, whereas this is the case for 
only 67 p.c. of sticky firms. Moreover, flexible firms are likely to face a higher elasticity of demand, 
they tend to attach more importance to competitors' prices in deciding to increase or decrease a 
price and to apply some form of pricing-to-market. However, no clear distinction could be made 
between both groups with respect to the mean score for the statement that the price is set 
according to the price of the main competitor(s). Overall, this evidence is slightly suggestive of a 
positive correlation between the degree of competition, on the one hand, and the degree of price 
flexibility, on the other hand, or, equivalently, between the degree of market power and the degree 
of price stickiness. 
 
Secondly, flexible firms prove to have less long-term relationships with customers (companies 
within the own group and companies outside the group they explicitly state to have a long-term 
relationship with). 
 
Third, flexible price firms are slightly more export-oriented, the latter factor being compatible with 
the finding that they are likely to have to face more competition as firms stated to have less market 
power on exports markets than on the domestic market. 
 
The conclusions drawn regarding the degree of optimal price-setting behaviour are more puzzling. 
We thought that when a sticky firm changes its price, the new price should immediately be the right 
one, taking into account all relevant information concerning the present and future economic 
context. Indeed, it is the price stickiness which induces firms to be forward-looking, leading to a re-
set price which is “on average” optimal over the period during which the price is expected to remain 
fixed. However, according to the survey results, sticky firms seem to have applied more often a rule 
of thumb and to have been less forward-looking than flexible firms at the time of their last price 
review. Probably this puzzling result is due the fact that the question on non-optimal price-setting is 
indeed only related to the last price change rather than to a more structural characteristic of the 
firms considered. 
 
Fifth, flexible firms attach somewhat less importance to theories on price rigidities. Their mean 
score for the theories on nominal rigidities is indeed slightly below the mean score of sticky firms. 
For the theories on real rigidities, both types of firms have the same mean scores. Overall, these 
findings seem to be compatible with economic theory. Without denying the importance of real 
rigidities and in particular their possible interaction with nominal rigidities, it is indeed normal to find 
that nominal rigidities play a somewhat more crucial role in determining the overall degree of price 
stickiness. Absent nominal rigidities, real rigidities will typically lead to small price changes, but not 
to infrequent price adjustment. Similarly, the literature shows that real rigidities magnify the degree  
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of monetary non-neutrality to a considerable extent, though they are not a source of non-neutrality 





This paper reports the results of an ad hoc survey on price-setting behaviour in almost 2,000 
Belgian firms, belonging to the sectors industry, construction, trade and services which overall 
represent 60 p.c. of GDP. The major advantage of the survey is that it also provides qualitative 
information and, as such, is a complement to recent quantitative work on Belgian micro price data. 
The survey conducted by the National Bank of Belgium is the Belgian part of a euro area-wide 
initiative in the context of the "Eurosytem Inflation Persistence Network". 
 
As to the questions aimed at describing the characteristics of the market firms are active on, they 
indicate that the majority of firms operate in an environment which clearly deviates from a situation 
of perfect competition. Firms seem to have some market power and more likely so on the Belgian 
market than on foreign markets. Pricing-to-market is applied by most industrial firms. Overall, it 
appears that conditions are met to make the pricing decision of a firm meaningful. 
 
This does not mean, however, that relationships with customers and the way competitors behave 
are not important for the price-setting behaviour of Belgian firms. The movement of competitors' 
prices is put forward by firms as an important factor inducing their own price adjustments and this 
seems to be somewhat more pronounced for price decreases than for price increases, whereas a 
single firm is reluctant to be the first to change its price. Besides, costs play an important role in 
price-setting decisions and apparently their role is somewhat more pronounced for price increases 
than for price decreases, whereas demand conditions seem to play a more predominant part in 
adjusting prices downwards. 
 
As to the frequency and the exact timing of price adjustments, there is ample evidence that prices 
are rather sticky, most firms adjusting their price only once a year. This estimate of the degree of 
price stickiness corresponds quite well with the results put forward in Taylor (1999). The longest 
durations are observed for services to enterprises and the shortest in the construction sector. The 
average duration between two price reviews is 10 months, whereas it amounts to 13 months 
between two consecutive price changes. This evidence is consistent with the fact that both the 
price-reviewing process and the act of changing a price entail specific costs. The majority of firms 
adopt time-dependent price-reviewing under normal circumstances. However, when specific events 
occur, most firms adopt state-dependent behaviour. These results put the macro-models used 
nowadays in a new light, as the latter generally assume the price-reviewing process to be time-
dependent.  
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Among the factors which hamper price adjustment, evidence was found of typical nominal rigidities 
(mainly the existence of implicit or explicit contracts with customers) and real rigidities (mainly flat 
marginal costs and different sources of counter-cyclical movements in desired mark-ups). This 
finding is in line with the New-Keynesian literature which emphasises the interplay between both 
types of rigidity - nominal and real - for a good understanding of inflation and output dynamics. 
Whereas nominal rigidities and flat marginal costs are typical ingredients of the class of 
New-Keynesian macro-models, this is far less so for (endogenous) counter-cyclical movements in 
mark-ups. Moreover, for only one third of firms the last price review occurred in an optimal way, 
whereas the others based their last pricing decision on a limited information set which did not 
comprise expectations of future economic conditions, or applied a rule of thumb. These results 
provide evidence of a substantial degree of non-optimal price-setting, suggesting that informational 
frictions might be an additional source of sluggishness in the inflation process. 
 
In case a comparison with other analyses is possible, our evidence, to a large extent, is consistent 
with the results from Belgian micro CPI data, as well as with similar surveys held in Sweden, Italy, 
the U.K. and the U.S. The latter applies to the observed degree of price rigidity, as well as to the 
more qualitative results, for instance in the field of time-versus state-dependent pricing and 
regarding the most important nominal and real rigidities which hamper price adjustment. Our results 
regarding the information set used could not be compared with other surveys. 
 
To a large extent, price-setting behaviour seems to be similar for the sectors covered (industry, 
construction, services to enterprises and trade), although some differences have been highlighted in 
the paper. Further research could be carried out on a less aggregated basis, in order to investigate 
possible diverging price-setting patterns between branches, as has already been done to some 
extent for retail, or to link the individual characteristics of firms with their price-setting behaviour. 
Another type of further research might link the survey results with firms' balance sheets. This might 
for instance allow conclusions as to whether there exists a relationship between price stickiness and 
firms' cost structure.  
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Appendix A - Sectoral coverage (NACE codes) 
 
Sectors outlined in bold are covered by the survey sample 
 
Code Description  Sector 
01  Agriculture, hunting and related service activities   
02  Forestry, logging and related service activities   
05  Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing   
10  Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat   
11  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas 
extraction excluding surveying 
 
12  Mining of uranium and thorium ores   
13  Mining of metal ores   
14  Other mining and quarrying   
15  Manufacture of food products and beverages  ⎫ 
16  Manufacture of tobacco products  ⎪ 
17  Manufacture of textiles  ⎪ 
18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  ⎪ 
19  Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, 
harness and footwear 
⎪ 
⎪ 
20  Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
⎪ 
⎪ 
21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products  ⎪ 
22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  ⎪ 
23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  ⎪ 
24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  ⎪ 
25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  ⎬ Industry 
26  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  ⎪ 
27  Manufacture of basic metals  ⎪ 
28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  ⎪ 
29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  ⎪ 
30  Manufacture of office machinery and computers  ⎪ 
31  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  ⎪ 
32  Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus  ⎪ 
33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks  ⎪ 
34  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  ⎪ 
35  Manufacture of other transport equipment  ⎪ 
36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  ⎪ 
37 Recycling  ⎭ 
40  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply   
41  Collection, purification and distribution of water   
45 Construction  ⎬Construction 










52  Retail trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair services of 
personal and household goods 
⎪ 
⎭ 
55  Hotel and restaurant services   
 
1  Except commission trade services, which are included in "Services to enterprises".  
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60  Land transport and transport via pipeline services  ⎬Services to enterprises 
61  Water transport services   
62  Air transport services   
63  Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agency services  ⎬Services to enterprises 
64  Post and telecommunication services   
65  Financial intermediation services, except insurance and pension funding services
1  
66  Insurance and pension funding services, except compulsory social security services   
67  Services auxiliary to financial intermediation  ⎫ 
70  Real estate services  ⎪ 
71  Renting services of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal 
and household goods 
⎪  
⎬ Services to enterprises 
72  Computer and related services  ⎪  
73  Research and development services  ⎪ 
74  Other business services  ⎭ 
75  Public administration and defence services; compulsory social security services   
80 Education  services   
85  Health and social work services    
90  Sewage and refuse disposal services, sanitation and similar services   
91 Membership  organisation services n.e.c.   
92  Recreational, cultural and sporting services   
93 Other  services   
95  Private households with employed persons   
99  Services provided by extra-territorial organisations and bodies   
 
1  Financial leasing is included in "Services to enterprises". 
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SURVEY ON PRICING BEHAVIOUR - INDUSTRY 
________________________________________________ 
Contact person for the questionnaire: +32(0)2 221 42 70 
 
Please return the questionnaire by 3 March 2004 at the latest. 
You can use the enclosed self-addressed envelope or our free of charge fax number 0800 95 969 (only in Belgium) or  
32 2 221 31 07 (only from foreign countries) 
 
 
Preliminary remarks: By "price" we mean the sales price actually charged, even in cases where it deviates from the list 
price. If you have different prices for different types of customers, please state the most common type of customer in your 
answer. 
 
Turnover of your company during the last available fiscal year (excluding VAT):............................................................ euro 
Which percentage of this turnover is generated:  - in Belgium................................................................................% 
  - in other euro area countries......................................................% 
  - outside the euro area................................................................% 
   ____ 
   100% 
 
Number of employees in your company, according to your latest declaration to the national social security office:persons 
 
 
Part A - Information on your main product and on the market in which it is sold 
 
 A1  What is your main product, in other words, the product that generates the highest turnover? .......................................... 
 
 A2  How much per cent of the turnover does your main product account for?   .....% 
 
 A3  What is, in terms of turnover, the main market for your main product? 
(tick only one answer please) 
 
  1  the Belgian market 
  2  another euro area country 
  3  a non-euro area country 
 
From now on, your answers should refer to the main market for your main product. In other words, when answering the 
questions, please always try to bear in mind the main product (  A1   ) and the main market 
 (  A3  ).  
 
 A4  How many competitors do you have on your main market for your main product? 
(tick only one answer please) 
 
  1 none 
  2  less than 5 
  3  between 5 and 20 
  4 more  than  20 
  5 I  don't  know   SURVEY ON PRICING BEHAVIOUR - INDUSTRY  Appendix B - The questionnaire 
________________________________________________________________________________________
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 A5  How much per cent of your turnover do you generate by selling your main product to: 
 
  -  companies and divisions within your own group  ....% 
  -  companies outside your own group with a long-term relationship  ....% 
  -  companies outside your own group without a long-term relationship  ....% 
  -  directly to consumers  ....% 
 -  government  ....% 
     _____ 
     100% 
 
 A6  If you decided to increase the price of your main product by 10%, all other factors remaining unchanged (including 
competitors' prices), by what percentage would the turnover of your main product fall? 
 
  by  ......%  1 I  don't  know 
 
 A7  Different factors can determine your competitiveness. What is the importance in your company of the factors listed 
below? 
please quote the relevant importance for each answer, by selecting one of the options: 
 1  = unimportant   2  = of minor importance   3  = important  4  = very important   ?  = I don't know 
 
     1   the price of our product 
 
     1   the quality of our product 
 
     1   the degree to which our product can be distinguished from that of our competitors 
 
     1   delivery period 
 
     1   long-term relationship with customers 
 
     1   the after-sales service 
 
     1     other factors; please specify ............   
 
 A8  Does your firm have the possibility to set the price of the main product itself, or is it set by somebody else? (tick only 
one answer please) 
 
  1  we set our price ourselves  ) continue to  A9  
  2  our price is set by the government 
  3  our price is set by the parent company/group  ) continue to  B5  
  4  others set the price;  
    please specify who ............................................................   
 
 A9  There are various ways of setting the price of your main product. How well do the following methods apply to the 
situation in your company? 
please quote the relevant importance for each answer, by selecting one of the options: 
 1  = unimportant   2  = of minor importance   3  = important  4  = very important   ?  = I don't know 
 
     1   we set our price fully according to our costs and a completely self-determined profit margin 
 
     1   we set our price according to the price of our main competitor(s), meaning that we do not determine our 
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Part B - Price adjustments 
 
 B1a  When do you review the price you want to charge for your main product (this does not necessarily mean that the 
price actually changes)? (tick only one answer please) 
 
  1  at  specific  time  intervals            
  2  mainly at specific time intervals, but also in reaction to specific events    ) continue to  B1b    
    (e.g.  a  considerable  change  in  our  costs)          
  3  in reaction to specific events  
    (e.g. a considerable change in our costs)            ) continue to    B2a  
  4  I  don't  know            
 
 B1b  If you review your prices at specific time intervals, how often does this occur (this does not necessarily mean that the 
price actually changes)? (tick only one answer please) 
 
  1  more than once a year  )  how many times a year?  .............................................. 
  2  once a year  )  in which month?  .............................................. 
  3  less than once a year  )  once in how many years?  .............................................. 
 
 B2a  How did you review the price of your main product the last time? (tick only one answer please) 
 
  1  we have applied a rule of thumb (e.g. a fixed amount/percentage change, indexation based on the consumer 
price index, ...) ) continue to    B3  
  2  we have considered a wide range of information (demand, costs, competitors' price ...) relevant for profit 
maximisation within our company ) continue to    B2b  
 
 B2b  If you considered a wide range of information the last time you reviewed the price, what was it related to? (tick only 
one answer please) 
 
  1  this range of information was only related to the present context in which our company operates 
  2  this range of information was related both to the present and to the expected future context in which our 
company operates 
 
 B3  Which factors cause you to raise/lower the price of your main product? 
please quote the relevant importance for each answer, by selecting one of the options: 
 1  = unimportant   2  = of minor importance   3  = important  4  = very important   ?  = I don't know 
   The importance of each factor may be different from one column to the other.  
Factors causing a price increase  Factors causing a price decrease 
     1   an increase in our labour costs       1   a decrease in our labour costs 
     1   an increase in our financial costs       1   a decrease in our financial costs 
     1   an increase in our other costs       1   a decrease in our other costs 
     1   an decrease in our productivity       1   a increase in our productivity 
     1   an increase in demand       1   a fall in demand 
     1   an increase in our competitors' price       1   a decrease in our competitors' price 
     1   other factors       1   other factors; 
 please  specify  ..........   please  specify  ..........  
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 B4  There can be various reasons as to why a price is not (or only very slightly) changed during a certain period.  Please 
indicate their importance in your company. 
please quote the relevant importance for each answer, by selecting one of the options: 
 1  = unimportant   2  = of minor importance   3  = important  4  = very important   ?  = I don't know 
 
     1   we have a written contract with our customers specifying that the price can only be adjusted when the 
contract is renegotiated   
     1   price changes entail "physical" costs (e.g. printing new catalogues, changing price tags, adjusting  
the website, ...)   
     1   it is costly in terms of time and/or money to collect relevant information for pricing decisions   
     1   our customers prefer a stable price and a change could damage customer relations, even if our competitors 
also change their price   
     1   there is a risk that competing companies might not adjust their prices and that we might be first.  So we wait 
for our competitors to act, and then follow suit.   
     1   in a recession, when cashflow is low, our price may need to be kept up in order to have sufficient liquidities 
at one's disposal. A substantial part of our costs is indeed fixed, whereas it takes some time before a price 
decrease results in a higher turnover.   
     1   our variable costs do not change much over the business cycle, which contributes to the price of our product 
remaining roughly the same   
     1   when our customers buy a lot, they have more interest in comparing prices than when they don't buy a lot. 
They are more sensitive to price changes in booms than in recessions.   
     1   during economic booms the costs incurred by the company to reach customers decline. This contributes to 
keeping our price down.   
     1   during an economic recession, it is more difficult to obtain external financing (e.g. bank loans). This 
contributes to keeping our price up.   
     1   our customer mix changes over the business cycle, during a recession we lose our least loyal customers, 
while more loyal customers remain. As the latter are less price-sensitive, our price can be left unchanged 
during a recession.   
     1   our price is set at an attractive threshold (e.g. 4.99 euro or 25.00 euro) and is only changed when it is 
convenient to move to a new attractive threshold   
     1   there is a risk that we subsequently have to readjust our price in the opposite direction   
     1   we are afraid that customers will interpret a price reduction as a reduction in quality   
     1   an increase in demand for our product is met by elements other than a price increase, e.g. an extension of the 
delivery period 
 
B5  How often does the price of your main product actually change, including reductions, but excluding sales or sell-off? 
(tick only one answer please) 
 
  1  more than once a year  )  how many times a year?   .......... 
  2  once a year 
  3  less than once a year ) once in how many years?   ..........  
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Part C - Pricing behaviour on other markets than the main market 
(only to be filled out by companies for which the market mentioned in  A3  is not the only market) 
 
 C1  You may have different prices according to the market on which you operate. Which of the following 
statements best describes your main product? (tick only one answer please) 
 
  1  the price denominated in euro is the same for all countries ) continue to  C3  
  2  the price denominated in euro is the same for all euro area countries, but not for non-euro area 
countries  
) continue to  C2  
  3  the price denominated in euro is different, both for euro area countries and for non-euro area 
countries  
) continue to  C2  
 
 C2  What is the importance of the following factors in a differentiated price-setting behaviour between 
markets?  
please quote the relevant importance for each answer, by selecting one of the options: 
 1  = unimportant   2  = of minor importance   3  = important  4  = very important   ?  = I don't know 
 
     1   exchange rate movement of the currency used for payment 
 
     1   tax system on the market (e.g. VAT-rate) 
 
     1   structural market conditions on the market (e.g. taste, standard of living,...) 
 
     1   cyclical fluctuations in demand on the market 
 
     1   the price of the competitor(s) on the market 
 
     1   rules on the market 
 
  1     other factors; please specify ..........   
 
 C3  Is competition for your main product stronger on the foreign market than on the Belgian market? (tick 
only one answer please) 
 
  1 yes 
  2 no 
  3  our company does not operate on the Belgian market 
  4 I  don't  know 
 
 








Thank you for taking part in the survey. 
 
  
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Appendix C - Decomposition of variance 
 
Notations: 
Belgian sample:  4 sectors  j = 1 to 4 
  3 sizes  i = 1 to 3 
 
For each stratum Sij, the following statistics are available: 
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A2 - percentage of turnover stemming from main product (table 2) 76,4 3,0 20,6
A4 - number of competitors (table 5) 92,5 1,0 6,5
A5 - main customers (table 4)
    companies within own group 91,8 4,0 4,3
    companies outside own group with LT relationship 90,0 2,0 8,0
    companies outside own group with no LT relationship 89,5 6,5 4,0
    consumers 78,6 3,4 18,0
    government 78,5 4,8 16,6
A6 - by what percentage would turnover fall if you increase the 
       price by 10% (table 6) 88,5 3,8 7,7
A7 - importance of factors determining competitiveness (table 7)
    price 95,1 1,5 3,4
    quality 97,5 2,0 0,6
    degree of differentiation 98,8 0,3 0,9
    delivery period 95,9 1,3 2,8
    long-term relations with customers 94,9 4,0 1,1
    after-sales service 94,2 2,9 3,0
    other factors 88,9 9,0 2,0
A8 - who sets the price of the main product?  95,8 1,1 3,1
A9 - importance of price-setting methods (table 8)
    price-maker 97,0 1,4 1,6
    price-taker 95,3 3,8 0,8
B1a - when do you review the price? (table 13) 95,9 3,2 1,0
B1b - implied duration between two consecutive price reviews (table 14) 97,3 1,4 1,3
B2a/b - how did you review your price the last time? (table 15) 89,9 5,5 4,6
B3 - importance of factors causing price increase (table 20)
    labour costs 86,5 2,8 10,8
    financial costs 95,9 1,9 2,2
    other costs 91,7 4,7 3,6
    productivity 97,0 0,9 2,1
    demand 95,4 2,5 2,1
    competitors' price 91,0 5,5 3,5
    other factors 81,6 6,8 11,7
B3 - importance of factors causing price decrease (table 20)
    labour costs 94,0 2,6 3,4
    financial costs 96,4 1,5 2,0
    other costs 94,2 3,1 2,7
    productivity 93,5 3,3 3,2
    demand 97,6 1,1 1,3
    competitors' price 89,6 4,9 5,5
    other factors 73,9 3,5 22,6
B4 - importance of theories on rigidities (table 18)
    Explicit contracts (no. 1) 78,9 4,7 16,4
    Physical menu costs (no. 2) 96,4 1,7 1,9
    Information-gathering costs / bureaucratic rigidities (no.3) 99,0 0,8 0,2
    Implicit contracts (no. 4) 96,5 2,1 1,5
    Kinked demand curve / coordination failure (no. 5) 93,6 2,4 4,0
    Importance of fixed costs / liquidity constraints (no. 6) 98,9 0,9 0,2
    Sluggish costs / constant marginal costs (no. 7) 95,7 3,6 0,7
    Thick-market demand (no. 8) 95,1 0,9 4,0
    Thick-market supply (no. 9) 95,7 2,7 1,7
    Counter-cyclical cost of finance (no. 10) 93,7 5,6 0,7
    Shifting customer clientele (no. 11) 94,4 4,0 1,6
    Pricing thresholds (no. 12) 89,9 2,1 8,0
    Risk to have to readjust price in opposite direction (no. 13) 97,4 2,1 0,5
    Judging quality by price (no. 14) 95,3 2,0 2,7
    Changing non-price elements (no. 15) 93,7 2,8 3,5
B5 - implied duration between two consecutive price changes (table 16) 95,7 2,6 1,7
Source : NBB.
(table.): number of the corresponding table in the paper
The results of total variance outlined in bold indicate that the variance between sectors is important and is thus discussed
in the text of the paper
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Appendix D - Significance tests for sectoral differences 
Table D1 - Chi-square test of equality of sectoral distributions  on a pair-wise basis
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 3.70 5.58 14.45
Construction - 9.41 0.27
Trade - 36.37
Services to enterprises -
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 4.83 2.46 12.43
Construction - 1.84 1.40
Trade - 8.03
Services to enterprises -
Question A5 - Main customers (critical value : 9.488) (table 4)
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 15.84 39.45 3.21
Construction - 10.09 9.84
Trade - 28.12
Services to enterprises -
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 0.42 6.44 6.28
Construction - 3.71 4.13
Trade - 2.30
Services to enterprises -
Question A8 - Who sets the price of the main product? (critical value : 7.815) 
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 1.22 3.79 1.16
Construction - 2.90 0.87
Trade - 4.07
Services to enterprises -
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 0.63 0.91 0.28
Construction - 0.81 1.25
Trade - 1.67
Services to enterprises -
Question B1b - Frequency of price reviews (critical value : 23.685) (table 14)
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - - 8.83 3.40
Construction - 7.27 5.46
Trade - 12.26
Services to enterprises -
Question B5 - Frequency of price changes (critical value : 23.685) (table 16)
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 2.11 7.42 7.19
Construction - 5.86 7.75
Trade - 12.44
Services to enterprises -
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 1.40 2.60 3.46
Construction - 0.11 1.18
Trade - 2.38
Services to enterprises -
Question B1a - When do you review the price of your main product? 
(critical value : 5.991) (table 13)
Question B2a/b - How did you review the price of your main product the last time? 
(critical value : 5.991) (table 15)
The results outlined in bold indicate that a chi-square test of equality of sectoral distributions on 
a pair-wise basis rejects the hypothesis that both sectors have the same structure at the 5% level 
of significance.
Question A2 - Percentage of turnover stemming from main product (critical value : 7.815) 
(table 2)
Question A4 - Number of competitors on the main market for the main product 
(critical value : 7.815) (table 5)
Question A6 - By what percentage would the turnover of your main product fall if you 




(table.): number of the corresponding table in the paper.  
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Table D2 - Spearman's correlation coefficient for sectors on a pair-wise basis
Question A7 - Importance of factors determining competitiveness (n=7) (table7)
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 0.82 0.54 0.93
Construction - 0.57 0.82
Trade - 0.64
Services to enterprises -
Question B3 - Importance of factors causing a price increase (n=7) (table 20)
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 0.54 0.46 0.82
Construction - 0.39 0.64
Trade - 0.21
Services to enterprises -
Question B3 - Importance of factors causing a price decrease (n=7) (table 20)
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 0.54 0.75 0.64
Construction - 0.29 0.86
Trade - 0.21
Services to enterprises -
Question B4 - Importance of theories on price rigidities (n=15) (table 18)
Industry Construction Trade Services to enterprises
Industry - 0.90 0.63 0.86
Construction - 0.63 0.90
Trade - 0.70
Services to enterprises -
Source : NBB.
(table.): number of the corresponding table in the paper
(n=.): number of elements in the ranking
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